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ABSTRACT 
We study the impact of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) on various 
macroeconomic outcomes in Thailand using synthetic control methods.  
Thailand is compared to a weighted average of control countries in terms of 
aggregate health and economic performance over the period 1995 to 2012. Our 
results suggest that financial protection in Thailand has improved relative to its 
synthetic counterfactual. While out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of 
overall health expenditures decreased by 16.9 percentage points, annual 
government per capita health spending increased by $78. However, we detect 
no impact on total health spending per capita nor the share of the government 
budget allocated to health. We find positive health impacts as captured by 
reductions in infant and child mortality. The introduction of UHC has had no 
discernible impact on GDP per capita. Our results complement micro 
evidence based on within country variation. The counterfactual design 
implemented here may be used to inform other countries on the causal 
repercussions and benefits of UHC at the macroeconomic level. 
Keywords 
Universal Health Coverage, macroeconomic impacts, synthetic control 
approach, Thailand. 
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“I regard universal health coverage as the single most powerful  
   concept that public health has to offer. It is inclusive. It unifies 
services and delivers them in a comprehensive and integrated  
way, based  on primary health care.” Dr Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General  
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the impact of universal health coverage1 (UHC) in Thailand on aggregate 
health care spending, GDP per capita and child and infant mortality rates. While there are many 
micro studies on the effects of UHC in developing countries (Limwattananon et al., 2015; 
Gruber et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2013; Wagstaff and Manachotphong, 2012; Barofsky, 2011), 
including Thailand, there is currently little causal evidence at the aggregate level.  
The WHO keenly advocates UHC as demonstrated by the 2013 World Health Report on 
universal health coverage. In 2009, only 58 countries were classified as having attained full 
UHC with Thailand being one of them (Stuckler et al., 2010). The country introduced the UHC 
policy, originally known as the 30 baht project, in 2001. Three different schemes are in place, 
including, two employment-based schemes2 and the recently introduced, tax-financed 
Universal Coverage Scheme. The nationwide roll-out of the Universal Coverage Scheme was 
completed within a year, reaching a coverage of 71 percent. Coverage increased to 95 percent 
in 2003, and 98 percent by 2011 (International Health Policy Program, 2011). Health care 
coverage was extended to 18.5 million uninsured people out of a population of 62 million 
(Towse et al., 2004). The benefit package for the insured includes inpatient and outpatient care 
at accredited facilities as well as access to prescribed medication.  
 
In the case of Thailand, existing micro evidence documents decreases in out-of-pocket 
payments and improved financial protection due to UHC. For instance, based on household 
data, Limwattananon et al. (2015) show that the Thai UHC reform reduced out-of-pocket 
expenditures by 28 percent.3 With regard to health outcomes and health seeking behavior, 
previous micro studies have also reported positive impacts. For instance, the Thai UHC 
positively affects working age people by reducing the likelihood that they report themselves to 
be too sick to work (Wagstaff and Manachotphong, 2012), it further increases the demand for 
outpatient services (Panpiemras et al., 2011), and preventive check-ups (Ghislandi et al., 2013). 
At the same time, there is no evidence that ex ante moral hazard increases (Ghislandi et al., 
2013). In addition, Gruber et al. (2014) show that infant mortality rates decreased due to better 
access to health services among poor Thai.  
While these papers provide useful evidence on the impact of the UHC scheme, for policymakers 
it is important to know what will happen to an entire economy after the introduction of UHC. 
Capturing aggregate effects is not straightforward and the literature is often restricted to papers 
that rely on micro data which may not always support generalization to the aggregate level. 
Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) is a notable exception. They assess the macro-economic 
                                                     
1 We apply the WHO’s definition of UHC. The goal of the scheme is “to ensure that all people obtain the health 
services they need – prevention, promotion, treatment, rehabilitation and palliation – without risk of financial ruin 
or impoverishment” (WHO, 2013). We use the terms universal health coverage and universal health care 
interchangeably. The former is often used in the context of developing countries to stress the idea of full population 
coverage. The latter pertains to the quality of care in developed countries (Stuckler et al., 2010).  
2 The employment based schemes are the Civil Servants Medical Benefits Scheme covering current and retired 
civil servants and their dependents and the Social Security Scheme providing benefits to employees of 
establishments with more than 10 workers. 
3 Similar evidence is reported for Mexico (Barofsky, 2011). Experiences from Taiwan and Mexico underline that 
UHC facilitates access to health care and financial risk protection for the poor (Lu and Hsiao, 2003; King et al., 
2009). 
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impacts of universal health coverage at the global level. Coverage is measured by pre-paid 
public and private health expenditure and immunization rates. The study estimates the effects 
of health coverage for a large panel of 153 countries over the period 1995 to 2008 by means of 
an instrumental variables approach to account for reverse causality. They find that expanding 
health care coverage improves population health as captured by reductions in child and adult 
mortality.4 Higher government health spending drives the reductions in mortality rates. In this 
paper, we also consider macro level effects of universal health coverage but focus on Thailand, 
as it is one of the few developing countries which has achieved UHC. 
 
Evaluating the impact of UHC on just one case does not lend itself to traditional models of 
impact evaluation and inference. Establishing credible counterfactuals is difficult. In this paper 
we use synthetic control methods (Abadie et al., 2010) to compare Thailand to a plausible group 
of control countries without UHC. This approach offers a fully data-driven way of finding an 
optimal weighted average of control countries so that they closely track Thailand in terms of 
outcomes of interest prior to UHC. The resulting “synthetic” Thailand is then used to simulate 
the country’s trajectory in the absence of UHC. Many other countries in the region have also 
shown improvements in the supply of health care. Our goal is to assess whether some of the 
observed changes in aggregate variables in Thailand can be attributed to the implementation of 
UHC, net of general trends for Thailand and its regional neighbors. At the aggregate, we 
carefully need to check “the ability of the control group to reproduce the counterfactual 
outcome trajectory that the affected units would have experienced in the absence of the 
intervention or event of interest.” (Abadie et al., 2010). 
Our assessment of the macro-economic impacts shows that between 1995 and 2012 UHC led 
to decreases in out-of-pocket payments and an increase in government spending. This is 
reflected in a 16.9 percentage point increase in government health spending as a percentage of 
total health expenditures. Government per capita health spending increased by about $78. At 
the same time, there was hardly any effect on total per capita health spending. We cannot 
document clear effects on the government budget share allocated to health. Overall, the 
introduction of UHC has neither harmed nor improved the economic performance of Thailand 
vis-à-vis the other countries in the region. There are no significant impacts on GDP per capita. 
While we do not have time series data on health seeking behavior, we examined mortality data 
at the national level. Aggregate infant and child mortality decreased by 20 percent relative to 
counterfactual countries in the region. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data sources, 
indicator definitions and the synthetic control approach. Section 3 discusses the results and 
related robustness tests. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. Methods 
Data sources and definition of indicators   
Our analysis covers the period 1995 to 2012 and relies on data from various sources. We use 
data from the World Health Organization’s Global Health Observatory to assess the impact of 
universal health coverage on several health-spending indicators. To assess the impact of the 
policy on financial protection as measured by out-of-pocket expenditures we use out-of-pocket 
expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure. The variable does not include regular 
                                                     
4 The instruments CO2 emissions and conflict deaths are used to generate exogenous variation in population health. 
The relationship between the instrumented mortality rates and the health coverage indicators is taken as yielding 
causal results. 
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insurance payments. Existing evidence indicates that high out-of-pocket payments are strongly 
related with catastrophic health spending and impoverishment (Chuma and Maina, 2012; 
Ghosh, 2011; Yardim et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2007). A complementary expenditure category is 
government expenditure on health as a percentage of total health expenditure. To achieve 
financial protection against catastrophic health spending, government spending needs to 
increase correspondingly. In many developing countries, including Thailand, there is an almost 
mechanical relationship between out-of-pocket payments and government health expenditure 
as a share of total health expenditure as these two sources constitute the two major components 
of total expenditure on health. The residual category includes private insurance programs and 
contributions to health care financing from charities. We also consider total health expenditures 
per capita and government health expenditure per capita. Finally, we consider another core 
indicator of health financing systems which is government expenditure on health as a 
percentage of the total budget. 
 
In addition to the effect of UHC on health spending we examine its effect on GDP per capita 
(PPP, constant $2005) and on infant and child (under-five) mortality. These data were obtained 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the UN Inter-Agency Group for 
Child Mortality Estimation, respectively. The mortality data is in part based on simulations and 
estimates have to be interpreted with this caveat on mind.5 However these mortality estimates 
are widely used and have already been analyzed in panel settings (Moreno-Serra and Smith, 
2015), as well as with the synthetic control method (Pieters et al., 2014). 
 
It would have been interesting to investigate the impact of UHC on a set of additional indicators 
such as health care utilization to capture demand for health services, government expenditure 
on education or other heads to expenditure in order to examine budgetary shifts, and on overall 
budget deficits to gauge fiscal sustainability. However, we were unable to find systematic and 
consistent time-series information for these indicators. 
 
 
Statistical analysis and composition of control group  
To analyse the effect of UHC on the evolution of annual health spending, the overall 
performance of the economy and child mortality rates, we compare Thailand’s performance 
with those of a synthetic control group, which is composed of a weighted average of other 
countries in the Asia and Pacific region without universal health care coverage. 
The synthetic control method is a fully data-driven way of determining a counterfactual for 
Thailand and allows for causal estimates in contexts with only one treated unit and a few control 
units. The pool of countries considered to create the synthetic control consists of 17 countries6, 
for which health and macroeconomic data are available for a period of six years before and 12 
years after the UHC reform in Thailand, that is, 1995 till 2012.7 
 
The method searches for an optimal combination of weights for the set of control countries to 
minimize pre-treatment differences between outcomes of interest. The applied weights result 
                                                     
5 Infant mortality is defined as the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births 
in a given year. Child mortality refers to the death of infants and children before reaching the age of five per 1,000 
live births. 
6 The countries included in the analysis are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.  
7 Unfortunately, no data are available on health expenditures for the years before 1995. Consequently, we cannot 
examine longer-term trends prior to UHC implementation.  
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from a recursive algorithm (quasi Newton method), sum up to one, are non-negative and range 
from zero to one. The computed sample weights are then applied to post-treatment outcomes to 
simulate Thailand’s path in the absence of UHC. If a good pre-treatment fit between Thailand 
and its synthetic control (i.e. the weighted average of control countries) is achieved, then 
differences in post-treatment outcomes may plausibly be attributed to the universal health care 
policy of the country.8 Other than matching Thailand to the pool of countries in terms of pre-
treatment outcome variables, we also include additional matching variables that describe the 
economic potential and the size of the country (log GDP per capita in the years 1995, 2000, 
2005 and 2010 and the total size of the population in 1995 and 2000). We also consider GDP 
per capita as an outcome variable and for this outcome we match on GDP in all years prior to 
treatment and population size in 1995 and 2000.  
We carefully constructed the pool of control countries in the region and excluded outliers or 
contaminated controls as advised by Abadie et al. (2010). We excluded developed countries 
(Japan and Australia). Two countries leave the sample due to missing data (Myanmar and 
Timor-Leste). We also dropped countries with health financing systems that are (nearly) 
universal or are moving towards universal health coverage9 (Minh et al., 2014; Asian 
Development Bank, 2011; Somanathan and Hafez, 2010; Rannan-Eliya and Sikurajapathy, 
2009). Finally, we exclude the special cases of India and China from the analysis, as they are 
considerably larger in geographical size10, have populations that are about 18 times larger than 
Thailand, and generate a volume of GDP (in 2005 PPP) that is at least 7.5 times higher. 
Especially the considerable differences in these economies lead us to exclude the two countries 
from the study: The total volume of GDP is crucial for tax revenues and thus the financing of 
government interventions such as universal health coverage. By restricting our samples to 
developing, non-UHC countries we ensure that our findings are based on a pool of countries 
that constitute reasonable counterfactual matches. 
 
3. Results 
The impact of universal health coverage using the synthetic control method   
To preview our results we find that UHC has led to substantial shifts in Thailand’s health 
spending relative to its synthetic control. We detect no impacts on GDP per capita and find 
some evidence of reductions in infant and child mortality which is consistent with existing 
micro evidence (Gruber et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 1 presents trends in outcomes in Thailand and its synthetic control before and after the 
introduction of the UHC policy. In the same Figure, we also plot a simple average of control 
countries. Across panels the synthetic control group provides a much tighter pre-policy fit than 
a simple average, corroborating the choice of synthetic control methods. To judge exact 
magnitudes, Table 1 presents the corresponding average treatment effects, i.e. differences in 
means before and after the introduction of UHC. Note that pre-treatment means across 
outcomes are well balanced (Table 1). That is to say, the synthetic control closely mimics the 
Thai situation before the introduction of UHC. 
 
How swiftly and strongly have expenditure patterns at the aggregate reacted relative to the 
synthetic control. That is, what would have happened in the absence of UHC? The analysis 
shows that out of-pocket-spending decreased following the introduction of UHC (Figure 1, 
                                                     
8 For further information about this technique see Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), Abadie et 
al. (2011), Donohue and Aneja (2012), Billmeier and Nanncini (2013), and Fremeth et al. (2013).  
9 These countries are Malaysia, Palau, Sri Lanka, and Tonga. 
10 India is six times and China is 19 times larger than Thailand in geographical size. 
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Panel A). The mean reduction in out-of-pocket-spending between Thailand and its synthetic 
control, i.e. difference in means post-policy, is 16.9 percentage points (Table 1). Government 
health spending as a percentage of total health expenditures perfectly offsets this fall (Figure 1, 
Panel B). This substitution arises due to the small residual categories (expenses for private 
insurance programs and contribution to health care financing from charities). The Thai 
government thus managed to protect its people against the economic hardships associated with 
(catastrophic) health care expenses. Note that almost full coverage was only obtained in 2003 
(International Health Policy Program, 2011), which may explain some of the sluggish, or lagged 
effects. 
 
With regard to per capita government health spending (in logs), we see a steady upward trend 
following UHC (Figure 1, Panel C). The mean difference in per capita government health 
spending between Thailand and its synthetic control amounts to about 39 percent. Does this 
considerable increase in government expenditure affect total per capita health expenditure? We 
present the results in Figure 1, Panel D. While there is an upward trend in per capita total health 
costs experienced in Thailand and across the region, we do not find that total health care costs 
increased due to UHC. If there is an increase at all it occurs after 2007 which raises the 
possibility that total health costs may have become burdensome. However, we are unable to 
document a steady increase in the share of the government budget that is allocated to health 
care (Figure 1, Panel E). In part this may be due to poor model fit as we are unable to establish 
a good pre-treatment trend for this variable. Notwithstanding this concern, we observe that after 
2008, the share of the Thai government budget used for health actually declines. On average, 
over this period the share of the government budget allocated to health rose by 1.54 percent 
(see Table 1) suggesting that a modest increase in the share of the budget allocated to health 
care expenditure was sufficient to reach UHC.   
 
Next we consider the impact on GDP per capita. Panel F in Figure 1 suggests that Thailand  
closely tracked its synthetic counterfactual before the introduction of UHC. Thereafter, we see 
a small positive impact on GDP, yet this effect is not “statistically significant” as we discuss 
later. Clearly, UHC has neither boosted nor harmed GDP per capita. To get a more complete 
picture of the macroeconomic effects, it would have been interesting to examine budget deficits 
and other items in the government budget (e.g. education). However to the best of our 
knowledge there are no consistent annual time series datasets on education expenditures and 
deficit for the period and region at hand. 
 
Turning to the effect of UHC on health outcome, we see in Panel G in Figure 1 that there is a 
decline in infant mortality due to UHC, averaging a reduction of more than three children per 
1,000 after the introduction of the policy. For child mortality a reduction of four children per 
1,000 can be observed (Figure 1, Panel H). Again, there is some indication of a lagged effect.  
 
Falsification tests and pseudo p-values 
While we have presented evidence that the impacts of UHC are “economically” important, i.e. 
sizeable, it is also important to judge the statistical significance of the observed impacts. Due 
to the small sample, classical tests of statistical significance cannot be applied to the synthetic 
control method. However we can gauge significance using pseudo p-values based on exact 
inference or permutation (Fremeth et al., 2013; Rosenbaum 2002a, 2002b). In Figure 2, we 
falsely assign the policy one-by-one to all the other countries in the pool of control countries 
resulting in 17 pseudo-treatments. The pseudo-treatments are presented in grey, the Thai impact 
is taken from Figure 1 and presented in black. The lines represent the difference between the 
falsely attributed country and the synthetic control. Thus, for a good fit prior to the treatment 
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in 2001, we expect the lines to be tightly aligned around zero. For an economically important 
difference after 2001, we expect the line to deviate considerably from zero.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates that prior to the policy all eight Thai indicators closely track their synthetic 
counterpart. After the policy, a number of variables clearly stand out relative to the placebos: 
out-of-pocket payments and government health expenditures as percentage of total health 
expenditures, per capita government health expenditures and the mortality indicators. We do 
not find similar changes for the falsely assigned control countries, that is, they do not exhibit a 
similarly tight pre-treatment trend. The pre-treatment trend for the control countries is best for 
government health expenditures as a percentage of total health expenditures (Figure 2, Panel 
B). But for all the other indicators that changed in response to the UHC policy we cannot 
establish similarly good pre-treatment trends for the falsely assigned control countries prior to 
2001.  
 
Figure 2, Panel A shows that the impact on out-of-pocket expenditures is most pronounced for 
Thailand. No other county has managed a similar decrease. In fact some countries even 
experienced an increase. Similarly, no country has augmented its government contribution to 
total health costs by as much as Thailand (Figure 2, Panel B). Turning to per capita government 
expenditures on health we observe that Thailand ranks among the two countries with highest 
expenditures (Figure 2, Panel C) whereas for total health expenditures Thailand ranks 
somewhere in the middle (Figure 2, Panel D). The picture looks similar for government health 
expenditures as a percentage of total government spending (Figure 2, Panel E). Thailand does 
not seem to disproportionately favor the health sector. In fact, a couple of other countries in the 
region allocate higher budget shares to the health sector. Similarly, we do not find that the 
change in Thailand’s GDP per capita post-UHC is very different from those of other countries 
in the region (Figure 2, Panel F). In terms of its achievements in reducing infant and child 
mortality Thailand outperforms the other countries as shown in the bottom two panels of Figure 
2.  Note that the mortality indicators for many of the falsely attributed countries do not have a 
good fit prior to the policy. Furthermore, many of the placebo models feature increases in 
mortality. 
 
We used the information displayed in the graphs to calculate ratios of post to pre-intervention 
root mean square prediction errors11 (RMSPE) for all placebos and Thailand. The logic behind 
the ratio is that a relatively large difference between treatment and control post-UHC as 
compared to prior UHC would indicate statistical significance. We also need to take into 
account the sign of the impact. To this end we multiply the RMSPE by minus 1 if the average 
impact was negative (Fremeth et al., 2013). We then rank the 18 RMSPEs and calculate pseudo 
p-values. For example, say Thailand is ranked first. The chance of this is 1/18 or 5.5 percent. 
While the p-values can be interpreted in the usual fashion, it is important to note that classical 
critical values can be misleading. Clearly, the smallest possible p-value is 5.5 percent. Moving 
down just one rank, already yields 2/18 or 11 percent. Figure 3 presents this more nuanced 
picture of “statistical significance” by relating pre and post-UHC differences between treatment 
and control and taking into account the sign of the impacts. The RMSPE ratios of out-of-pocket 
payments, infant and child mortality rank lowest indicating a “statistically significant” 
reduction due to UHC (Figure 3, Panels A, G, H); the RMSPE ratio of per capita government 
health expenditures ranks highest pointing to a “statistically significant” increase (Figure 3, 
Panel C). In other words we can assign pseudo p-values of 5.5 percent to all these impacts. The 
                                                     
11 The RMSPE is calculated by taking the root of the average square difference between Thailand and the weighted 
average of control countries. We calculate this measure of prediction error for the period before and after UHC 
implementation. 
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p-value for government health expenditures as percentage of total health expenditures is 2/18 
or 11 percent (Figure 3, Panel B). For the three remaining variables - per capita total health 
expenditures, government health expenditures as percentage of total government spending and 
GDP per capita - we observe increases but they are not statistically significant (Figure 3, Panels 
D, E, F). Overall, we conclude that based on the synthetic control approach we find 
economically and “statistically significant” effects of UHC on financial protection working 
through increases in government health care spending and improved health as captured by 
reduced infant and child mortality. 
 
Robustness checks using linear regression models 
To verify the robustness of our completely flexible and data driven synthetic control evidence, 
we also estimated the average impact of UHC on all outcomes using linear regression models. 
In these simple regression models we account for country-specific and year-specific effects and 
estimated the impact on all outcomes jointly using a seemingly unrelated regression system to 
account for error correlations across models. It is re-assuring that estimates in Table 3 point in 
the same direction. Of course standard errors have to be taken with a grain of salt given that 
only one country is “treated.” Unlike the synthetic control models, it is hard to gauge the 
dynamics before and after UHC implementation. Note that the linear regression models 
underestimate the average increase in log government health expenditures per capita and the 
reduction in child mortality. 
 
4. Conclusion 
By providing macroeconomic evidence on the effect of UHC this paper complements the 
existing microeconomic evidence on universal health coverage in the case of Thailand. 
Evidence on the aggregate effects of UHC are important from a policy perspective. The 
synthetic control approach adopted in this paper showed that the UHC policy has led to a 
reduction in out-of-pocket expenditure which was matched by a corresponding increase in 
government expenditure on health without any increases in total per capita spending on health. 
Increases in the share of the government budget allocated to health were modest and statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, we did not find any effect of UHC on GDP per capita but did find that 
the policy has worked towards reducing infant and child mortality. The results presented in this 
paper yield useful information for Thailand as well as for other lower and middle income 
countries as they strive to introduce policies to reach UHC. The approach presented here may 
be fruitfully applied to detect the aggregate consequences of such policies.  
 
By design the macro approach used here cannot be used to identity effects by income groups 
or by regions.  The approach presented here should be viewed as a complement to micro 
approaches and an arguably credible way of carrying out rigorous macro-economic assessments 
of policies such as UHC. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Outcome variables before and after universal health coverage 
 Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment 
 Thailand 
Synthetic 
Control 
Thailand 
Synthetic 
Control 
Out-of-pocket as % of total health expenditures   37.600 37.522 20.183 37.105 
Government health expenditures as % of total health 
expenditures 
52.350 52.427 70.067 50.494 
Log total health expenditures per capita (PPP $)  5.165 5.165 5.595 5.458 
Total health expenditures per capita (PPP $)  175.567 175.529 277.775 223.644 
Log government health expenditures per capita (PPP $)  4.515 4.510 5.234 4.848 
Government health expenditures per capita (PPP $)  91.767 91.719 198.867 120.939 
Government health expenditures as % of total government 
spending  
10.167 10.157 13.350 11.809 
Log GDP per capita (constant $) 7.710 7.710 7.933 7.850 
GDP per capita (constant $) 2,233.881 2,233.119 2,809.253 2,540.717 
Log infant mortality (per 1,000)  3.061 3.061 2.668 2.854 
Infant mortality (per 1,000)  21.400 21.434 14.558 17.957 
Log child mortality (per 1,000)  3.230 3.234 2.821 3.022 
Child mortality (per 1,000)  25.367 25.404 16.983 21.147 
Note: These are outcome averages for Thailand and synthetic control corresponding to the weights in Table 2 
and models in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Country weights for the construction of the synthetic control group 
 
Out-of-
pocket as % 
of total 
health 
expenditures   
Government 
health 
expenditures 
as % of total 
health 
expenditures 
 Log total 
health 
expenditures 
per capita 
(PPP $) 
Log 
government 
health 
expenditures 
per capita 
(PPP $)  
Government 
health 
expenditures 
as % of total 
government 
spending 
Log GDP 
per capita 
(constant 
$) 
Log 
infant 
mortality 
(per 
1,000)  
Log child 
mortality 
(per 
1,000)  
Bangladesh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Cambodia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Fiji 0.547 0.349 0.113 0.315 0.450 0.642 0.009 0.064 
Indonesia 0.004 0.508 0.261 0.268 0.276 0.295 0.073 0.066 
Kiribati 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Marshall Islands 0.000 0.000 0.626 0.416 0.273 0.009 0.000 0.000 
Micronesia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Nepal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Pakistan 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Papua New Guinea  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
The Philippines 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Samoa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.918 0.871 
Solomon Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Tuvalu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Vanuatu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Vietnam 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3: The impact of universal health care coverage in Thailand using panel regressions 
 
Out-of-pocket 
as % of total 
health 
expenditures   
Government 
health 
expenditures 
as % of total 
health 
expenditures 
Log 
government 
health 
expenditures 
per capita 
(PPP $)  
Log total 
health 
expenditures 
per capita 
(PPP $)  
Government 
health 
expenditures 
as % of total 
government 
spending  
Log 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
$) 
Log 
infant 
mortality 
(per 
1,000)  
Log 
child 
mortality 
(per 
1,000)  
Universal Health Coverage -15.99* 18.24* 0.22* -0.07 1.40+ 0.04 -0.16* -0.14* 
(1= for Thailand after 2001) (1.24) (1.44) (0.06) (0.05) (0.84)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  
Note: N=324, all countries in table 2 are used as (equally weighted) controls. All regressions include time and country 
dummies. Models are jointly estimated in a system of seemingly unrelated regression models (SUR). Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level. * p-value 0.05, + p-value 0.10. 
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Figure 1: The impact of universal health care coverage in Thailand on aggregate variables 
 
Panel A: Out-of-pocket expenditures 
as % of total health expenditures 
 
Panel B: Government health expenditures  
as % of total health expenditures 
 
Panel C: Log government health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
Panel D: Log total health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
Panel E: Government health expenditures as % of total 
government spending 
 
Pa nel F: Log GDP per capita  
(constant $) 
 
 
Panel G: Log infant mortality (per 1,000) 
 
 
Panel H: Log child mortality (per 1,000)  
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Figure 2: Placebo tests of falsely attributing the policy to other countries in the pool of 
control countries (Impact on Thailand in black) 
Panel A: Out-of-pocket 
as % of total health expenditures 
 
Panel B: Government health expenditures  
as % of total health expenditures 
 
Panel C: Log government health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
Panel D: Log total health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
Panel E: Government health expenditures as % of total 
government spending 
 
Pa nel F: Log GDP per capita  
(constant $) 
 
Panel G: Log infant mortality (per 1,000)  
 
Panel H: Log child mortality (per 1,000)  
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Figure 3: Ratios of pre- and post-intervention root mean square error (RMSPE) 
Panel A: Out-of-pocket 
as % of total health expenditures 
 
Panel B: Government health expenditures  
as % of total health expenditures 
 
 
Panel C: Log government health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
 
Panel D: Log total health expenditures  
per capita (PPP $) 
 
Panel E: Government health expenditures as % of total 
government spending 
 
Pa nel F: Log GDP per capita  
(constant $) 
 
Panel G: Log infant mortality (per 1,000)  
 
Panel H: Log child mortality (per 1,000)  
 
 
